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INTRODUCTION 
In the third of a century since it was handed down, Chevron' has 
become by far the most widely cited case in U.S. legal history.' This fact 
may cause one to view Chevron as an independent phenomenon. Yet 
deference doctrine generally and Chevron in particular are better understood 
as part of the ocean of administrative law. They are moved by the same 
gales as roil that ocean. 
Chevron rose in tax over several decades. It is now receding in tax. 
King v. Burwell' is part of that recession and may well contribute to its 
acceleration. 
* University Professor, Florida State University College of Law. sjohnson@lawJsu.edu. 
I. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
2. See, e.g., STEPHEN G, BREYER ET AL., ADMINIS1RATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 247 
(6th ed. 2006). The gap has widened in the years since. 
3. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
19 
Vol. 2015 The Rise and Fall of Chevron in Tax 
PEPPERDINE LAW REvIEW 
These phenomena are not random. Both the flood tide and the neap tide 
resulted from the pull of broader administrative law currents. Chevron's 
level rose in tax because of the bankruptcy of tax parochialism, the view that 
tax is unique and so should fall largely outside of administrative law rules. 
Chevron's level is falling in tax for the same reason it is falling 
generally. Administrative law is an ever-shifting balance of practical 
expediency and constitutional legitimacy .4 This leaves many administrative 
law doctrines with roots too shallow to thrive. 
So it is with Chevron. Internal inconsistencies in Chevron have become 
more, not less, glaring over time. Chevron was murky from the start and has 
become murkier with passing years.' It is hardly surprising, therefore, that a 
rising chorus has elaborated Chevron's inadequacies ,6 called for its 
abrogation,' and charted its decline.' 
I added my voice to that chorus in a 2012 article.' That article noted 
that "there appears to be a move afoot to downplay Chevron, not in name but 
in fact," 10 and it predicted that, rather than Chevron being expressly 
overturned, the likeliest outcome would be that the courts would "continue 
to honor Chevron in name but apply it so that, in substance, it is no longer an 
independently operative principle of law ."11 Those drawn to honest labeling 
might prefer that the Court formally overturn Chevron. But, although the 
Court sometimes does overrule its precedents,12 its preference is to keep 
things fluid, in order to facilitate coalition building and preserve room for 
4. E.g., Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action-A Revisionist History, 
43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 245 (1991) ("[O]ne cannot conclude that there is one ideal and elegant 
allocation of power between court and agency where administrative law will necessarily have to 
rest."). 
5. An excellent report noted: "[T]he degree of deference that federal courts owe to 
administrative pronouncements is a vexing issue, one frequently scrutinized by the Supreme Court. 
Regular attention from the Supreme Court, however, has failed to produce clarity for administrative 
law, in general, or for tax law, in particular." ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on 
JudicialDejerence,51 TAX LAW. 717, 719-20 (2004). 
6. E.g., Ann Graham, Searching for Chevron in Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court and 
Judicial Review of Agency Regulatioris, 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 229 (2008). 
7. E.g., Jack M. Beerman, ETUi the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed 
and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled. 42 CONN. L. REV. 779 (2010); Bryan T. Camp. 
Interpreting Statutory Silence, 128 TAX NOTES 501, 507 (2010); Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical 
Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN.L. REV. 567 (1992). 
8. E.g., Linda Jellum, Chevron's Demise: A Survey ofChevronfrom Infancy to Senescence, 59 
ADMIN. L. REV. 725 (2007). 
9. Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA. TAX 
REV. 269, 280 (2012). 
10. Id. at 280-4!1. 
11. Id.at283. 
12. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 16 GEO. LJ. 1361 
(1988) (identifying numerous such cases). 
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maneuver in future cases.13 Given this preference, keeping Chevron alive in 
name only may be the best reasonably attainable outcome. 
Part I of this article sketches the rise of Chevron in tax, culminating in 
the Supreme Court's Mayo decision in 2011,14 rejecting tax exceptionalism. 
A recurring note is ambiguity-uncertainty as to the reach and meaning of 
Chevron. 
Part II explores the fall of Chevron in tax. Chevron has receded in tax 
because it, at least in its original form, is receding everywhere. Realization 
of Chevron's inadequacies is causing the courts to multiply exceptions to 
Chevron and to apply it in ways that rob Chevron of its original deferential 
nature. 
Part ill concludes. It opines that the rise and fall of Chevron in tax do 
not represent wasted motion leaving us in the same place as where we 
started. Instead, by opening to a wider world of administrative law, tax 
practice has the potential to improve.15 
I. CHEVRON'S RISE IN TAX 
A. Before Chevron 
Deference issues did not begin with Chevron. In tax and other areas, the 
courts have wrestled for centuries with the weight to accord to agency rules 
and interpretations .16 
These cases instructed that tax regulations should be upheld ''unless 
unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes."17 Thus, in 
their verbal formulation at least, the pre-Chevron tax cases remind one of the 
deferential part of Chevron: its step two. 
13. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 
817-30 (1982). 
14. Mayo Found. for Educ. Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011); see Steve R. Johnson, 
Mayo and the Future o/TaxRegulations, 130TAXNOTES 1547 (Mar. 28,2011). 
15. For a discussion of the opportunities created for taxpayers by the entry of administrative law 
into tax, see Johnson, supra note 9, at 300-25. 
16. E.g., Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931) (stating that tax 
regulations "are valid unless unreasonable or inconsistent with the statute''); cf. International Ry. Co. 
v. Davidson, 257 U.S. 506, 514 (1922) (stating the same as to cost.oms duties the Court called 
"virtually [the] laying [of] a tax"). For discussion of pre-Chevron cases outside of tax, see Mark 
Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency 
lnterpretatioris of Statutes, 73 TEx. L. REV. 83, 87-94 (1994). 
17. Comm.'r v. S. Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948); see also Manhattan Gen. Equip. 
Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) (to be valid, a regulation must ''be consistent with the 
statute, [and] it must be reasonable"). For discussion of prominent pre-Chevron tax cases, see Steve 
R. Johnson, Swallows Holding as It ls: The Distortion of National Muffler, 112 TAX NOTES 351, 
362---05 (July 24, 2006). 
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The most frequently cited case of the line, National Muffl.er, used the 
same general reasonableness formulation.18 It also distilled prior cases to 
identify six considerations potentially relevant to the reasonableness 
inquiry.19 
B. Chevron and Its Immediate Aftermath 
In 1984 in Chevron, the Court unanimously upheld an EPA regulation.20 
Based on notions of expertise, political responsiveness, and delegation, the 
Court concluded that Congress usually wants agencies, not courts, to fill 
statutory gaps.21 It announced the famous "two step" under which a court 
asks first whether the statute is ambiguous.22 If it is, the court asks second 
whether the agency's position is at least reasonable." 
It was initially unclear whether Chevron applied to all agency actions. 
Subsequent cases, most prominently Mead,24 answered the question in the 
negative. Mead held that an agency's interpretation "qualifies for Chevron 
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency 
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency 
interpretation ... was promulgated in the exercise of that authority ."25 Mead 
converted the Chevron two step into a three step, the new step (step zero 
because it necessarily precedes step one) being determining whether 
Chevron applies at all to the case at hand.26 
Agency interpretations not satisfying Mead are evaluated under the 
Skidmore "standard,"27 which is neither a standard nor deferential.28 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, Skidmore "has produced a spectrum of judicial 
18. Nat'! Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477-78, 488 (1979). 
19. Id. at 477 (rehearsing contemporaneity of the regulation and the statute, the manner of 
evolution of non-contemporaneous regulations, the tenure of the regulation, the reliance placed upon 
it, the consistency of interpretation, and the degree of congressional scrutiny during reenactments). 
20. Chevron, U.S.A.,Inc. v.Natura!Res. Def. Council,Inc.,467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
21. Id. at 843-45, 865-66. 
22. Id. at 842-43, 865. 
23. Id. 
24. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
25. Id.at226-27. 
26. See Cass R. Sunst.ein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). 
27. Mead, 533 U.S. at227-28; see Skidmore v. Swift& Co.,323 U.S.134, 140 (1944). 
28. According to Skidmore, "[t]he weight [accorded to the agency's position] will depend upon 
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its :reasoning, its consistency with earlier 
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control." Id. 
Ultimately, an undifferentiated "all factors" test is not a test at all. E.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 
U.S. 667, 675 n.5 (1982). And, upholding the agency only if the court agrees with "the validity of 
[the agency's] reasoning" can hatdly be described as deference. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
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responses, from great respect at one end ... to near indifference at the 
other."29 
Chevron's domain seemed to expand in 2005 in Brand X, which held 
that agencies can often, in effect, overrule judicial decisions. "A court's 
prior construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise 
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its 
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus 
leaves no room for agency discretion."30 
C. Mayo 
Views differed as to whether Chevron did and should apply to tax.31 
Some took an understandable but regrettable view that "tax is special; the 
normal administrative law rules don't apply to us."32 
The Supreme Court had frequent opportunities to settle this question in 
the 1980s through early 2000s. Unfortunately, the Court at first 
compounded the confusion rather than dispelling it. In the 1985 Boyle case, 
the Court cited Chevron but not National Muffler." In the 1991 Cottage 
Savings case, the Court cited National Muffler's general language but not its 
six particular considerations and not Chevron." In 1998 in Atlantic Mutual, 
the Court cited both Chevron and Cottage Savings but not National 
Muffler.35 In 2001 in Cleveland Indians, the Court cited National Muffler 
but not Chevron." In 2003 in Boeing, the Court cited Cottage Savings but 
neither Chevron nor National Muffler.31 In none of these cases did the Court 
explain why it applied or eschewed the various precedents. 
Nonetheless, it was widely accepted that Chevron did supply the 
governing standard when specific authority tax regulations are challenged." 
29. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228. 
30. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). 
31. Among early commentary, see Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax 
Regulatioris, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 51 (1996); John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and 
Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35 (1995); Mitchell M. Gans, 
Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 731 (2002). 
32. For denunciations of such ''tax exceptionalism," see Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas 
Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX. REY. 517 (1994); Kristin E. 
Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. 
REV. 1537 (2006). 
33. United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 n.4 (1985). 
34. Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r,499 U.S. 554,560-61 (1992). 
35. Atlantic Mut. ms. Co. v. Comm'r, 523 U.S. 382, 387, 389 (1998). 
36. United States v. Cleveland Indians B"'°ball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219 (2001). 
37. Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S.437,448 (2003). 
38. E.g., El. du Pont de Nemnurs & Co. v. Comm'r, 41 F.3d 130, 135-36 (3d Cir. 1994); Carlos 
v. Comm'r, 123 T.C. 275,280 (2004). 
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The majority view was that Chevron also controlled challenges to general 
authority tax regulations." 
Any lingering doubt was-or should have been-dispelled by the 
Court's 2011 Mayo decision.40 Mayo is significant for three reasons. First, 
dealing a mortal blow to tax exceptionalism, the Court stressed "the 
importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of 
administrative action."41 The Court did preface this statement with the 
observation that the taxpayer had failed to offer a justification for departing 
from the administrative law norm. "In the absence of such justification, we 
are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for 
tax law only ."42 Taken literally, this might leave an opening for taxpayers to 
develop justifications in future cases challenging tax regulations. However, 
it is likely that this ship has already sailed. 
Second, the Mayo Court made clear that "[t]he principles underlying our 
decision in Chevron apply with full force in the tax context .... We see no 
reason why our review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency 
expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as our review of other 
regulations."" Thus, the Court held-and Mayo was decided 
unanimously-that Chevron, rather than National Muffler, "provide[s] the 
appropriate framework.'..., 
Some commentators still urge that National Muffler be resurrected in 
whole or in part.45 Life is endlessly surprising. Nonetheless, I expect that 
National Muffler will be revived around the time the Romanovs regain the 
throne of Russia. Not only was Mayo a unanimous decision, it also-far 
from being a radical doctrinal revision-is consistent with ample post-
National Muffler precedents. Mayo specifically rejected several National 
Muffler factors, such as consistency, antiquity, and contemporaneity .46 
Previous cases had done so as well.47 
39. See, e.g., Bankers Llfe & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 982 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 961 (1998); Swallows Holding Ltd. v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 96, 180-81 (2006) 
(Holmes, J ., dissenting) (surveying the circuits), vacated & remanded, 515 F 3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008). 
40. Mayo Found. for Educ.Research v. United States, 562 U.S.44 (2011). 
41. Id. at 55 (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999)). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 55-56. 
44. Id. at 57. 
45. E.g., Leslie Boodry, Judicial Deference Post-Mayo Foundation: Why the National Muffler 
Factors Shoukl Be Incorporated into Step Two of Chevron, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2014); Matthew 
H. Friedman, Reviving National Muffler: Analyzing the Effect of Mayo Foundation on Judicial 
Deference as Applied to General Authority Tax Guidance, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 115 
(2012). 
46. Mayo, 562 U.S. at 54-55. 
47. E.g., United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 316 (2009) (consistency); Smiley v. 
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Third, the Court made clear that the same standard applies to general 
authority regulations as applies to specific authority regulations. The 
regulation at issue in Mayo had been promulgated under I.R.C. § 7805(a), 
not under a delegation within a specific section.48 The Court noted both pre-
Chevron cases stating that specific authority tax regulations receive greater 
deference than general authority tax regulations and post-Chevron cases 
according deference to general authority regulations.49 The Court stated that 
"the administrative landscape has changed significantly" since the pre-
Chevron tax cases and that, especially when the regulation has gone through 
notice-and-comment procedures,'0 the policies behind Chevron are engaged 
no less by general authority delegations than by specific authority 
delegations." 
However, Chevron does not control when the IRS's position is 
embodied in a pronouncement of less stature than regulations." Revenue 
rulings, notices, and the like typically are not submitted for notice and 
comment and do not have the force of law .53 It is now essentially settled that 
the validity of such positions is measured under Skidmore, not Chevron." 
Citibank (SD.) N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740 (1996) (antiquity, contemporaneity, and consistency). The 
regulation upheld in Chevron was promulgated years after the statute was enacted, and it reversed an 
earlier regulation. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 857-
58 (1984). 
48. For decades, the IRS has been calling general authority regulations '':interpretive regulations" 
and calling specific authority regulations "legislative regulations." For decades, they have been 
wrong. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, Interm.ountain and the Importance of Administrative Law in Tax 
Law, 128 TAX NOTES 837, 843-46 (Aug. 23, 2010). 
The tax community generally marched under this banner of error. Fortunately, the Tax Court 
recently recanted. Altera Corp. v. Comm'r, 145 T.C. No. 3, slip op. at *14 n.10 (2015) (unanimous 
en bane opinion). It remains to be seen how long Treasury/IRS will cling to error in increasing 
isolation before their inevitable surrender. 
49. Mayo, 562 U.S. at 56-57 (citing cases). 
50. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012). Use of the notice-and-comment procedures is a "significant" 
indication that Chevron applies. E.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551U.S.158, 173-
174 (2007); United States v. Mead Cmp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31 (2001). 
51. Mayo, 562 U.S. at 5~57 ("Our inquiry ... does not tum on whether Congress's delegation 
of authority was general or specific."). 
52. For description of such pronouncements, see DAVID M. RICHARDSON, JEROME BORISON & 
STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE 17-32 (2d ed. 2008); Kristin E. IIlckman, /RB Guidance: 
The No Man's I.and of Tax Code Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239, 242-52 (2009). 
53. For an argument that the force of law concept is hard to apply in tax, see Kristin E. IIlckman, 
Unpacking the Force ofLaw,66 VAND.L.REv. 465 (2013). 
54. E.g., Voss v. Comm'r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1066 (9th Cir. 2015); id. at 1071 (Ikuta, J., dissenting) 
(agreeing on this point with the majority); Taproot Ad.min. Servs., Inc. v. Comm'r, 133 T.C. 202, 
212 (2009), affd, 619 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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II. THE FALL OF CHEVRON JN TAX (AND ELSEWHERE) 
The Supreme Court considered Chevron in two tax cases after Mayo: 
Home Concrete" and King .56 As discussed below, Chevron was of no help 
to the ms either time. Chevron still occasionally supports pro-agency 
outcomes at the Supreme Court'' and lower court levels." On the whole, 
however, the Court has shown itself adept at finding ways to undercut 
Chevron. 
Below, we first note the "why" of limiting Chevron, that is, the 
deficiencies of Chevron that inspire caution about applying the case 
robustly. Given space constraints, this endeavor will involve enumeration, 
not detailed exploration. Thereafter, we will address the "how" of 
limitation, that is, the variety of doctrinal devices courts have used since 
Mayo to avoid Chevron or to limit its effect. 
A. The Why of Limitation 
The complaint most frequently lodged against Chevron involves its 
unpredictability, both as to when it will be applied and what results it will 
produce when applied." Part of the confusion is the persistent use of 
"deference" to refer to both force-of-law regulations and mere non-binding 
guidance documents, two different kinds of agency positions .60 
But there are deeper problems. Chevron lacks an adequate theoretical 
foundation.61 One problem is that the notion of delegation-which, as we 
have seen, is a major prop of Chevron-is an unhelpful fiction.62 
55. United States v. Homo Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. a. 1836 (2012). 
56. King v. Burwell, 135 S. a. 2480 (2015). 
57. E.g.,EPA v.EMEHomer City Generation,L.P., 134S.Q.1584,1603--09 (2014). 
58. E.g., Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 61-63 (4th Cir. 2011). 
59. E.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 295 (2009) 
(Scalia, J., concurring); Thirty Years of Chevron v. NRDC and the Administrattve Law Review: A 
Letter from the Executive Board, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 235, 238 (2014) (noting the "strikingly 
contradictory Supreme Court decisions which continually led academia to question [Chevron's] 
relevance") [hereinafter Executive Board]. 
60. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 282-83; Cooley L. Howarth Jr., United States v. Mead Corp.: 
More Pieces for the Chevron/Skidmore Deference Puzzle, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 699, 701 (2002). But 
see Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 331, 351 (2011) (noting thst, although they are not legally binding, guidance 
documents can have great practical consequence). 
61. E.g., Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: Haw Chevron 
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN L. REV. 673 (2007). For 
discussion of the political theory underpinnings of Chevron, see Seidenfeld, supra not.e 16, at 94-
103. 
62. See, e.g., Frederick Liu, Chevron as a Doctrine of Hard Cases, 66 ADMIN L. REV. 285 
(2014); Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron's Foundation, 86 NOTREDAMEL.REv. 273, 276-88 (2011). 
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Another fundamental problem is the failure of Chevron to deal 
convincingly with an old problem. The Vesting Clause of Article I of the 
Constitution" confers the lawmaking power upon Congress. Congress 
cannot delegate that power.64 The Vesting Clause of Article In«' confers 
upon the courts the power to "say what the law is."66 This power too may 
not be delegated.67 Why then can agencies create binding law to fill in 
statutory gaps, and why will courts defer to agency interpretations that the 
courts believe are wrong though not so obviously wrong as to be 
unreasonable?68 
Various attempts have been made to square the power Chevron 
seemingly gives to agencies with these constitutional provisions ,6' but no 
durable consensus has yet emerged. Doubts on this score are never far 
beneath the surface and have been powerfully voiced by some justices in 
recent cases .7° 
Such concerns are compounded by the fact that Chevron created a 
judicial rule to allocate power when a statutory rule doing just that already 
existed. The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") includes provisions 
governing judicial review of agency actions. It empowers federal courts to 
"hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found 
to be ... arbitrary, capricious, [or] in excess of statutory ... authority."71 
Yet, in the view of some, "[h]eedless of the original design of the APA, [the 
Supreme Court has] developed an elaborate law of deference to agencies' 
interpretations," expanding the power of agencies beyond the balance 
63. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ I. 
64. E.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531U.S.457, 472 (2001); Wayman v. Southard, 23 
U.S.1,42-43 (1825). 
65. U.S. CONST. art. ill,§ I. 
66. Marbury v.Madison, 5U.S.137,177 (1803). 
67. E.g., Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608--09 (2011). 
68. E.g., Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'! Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 826 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., writing 
for the Court) ("A court must uphold the [agency's] judgment as long as it is a permissible 
construction of the statute, even if it differs from how the court would have interpreted the statute in 
the absence of an agency regulation."). 
69. As to the Article I problem, see J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 
410--11 (1928) (noting that the three branches share the various powers, and stating that, when 
Congress lays down an intelligible principle to guide the agency, the agency does not make law but 
is merely the agent of Congress). 
Leading scholars have proposed different solutions to the Article I problem. See Henry P. 
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26 (1983); Seidenfeld, 
supra note 62, at 289-311; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Puwer to Say What 
tM Law ls, 115 YALEL.J. 2580, 2589--98 (2006). 
70. E.g., DOT v. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1237 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 
1240--52 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
71. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C) (2012). 
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Congress struck in the APA.72 
Underlying these objections is concern that deference doctrine has 
abetted fundamental transformation of the American constitutional structure. 
"The Framers could hardly have envisioned today's vast and varied federal 
bureaucracy and the authority administrative agencies now hold over our 
economic, social, and political activities.'"' Deference doctrine, some 
justices believe, has been one of the culprits. 
Perhaps there is some unique historical justification for deferring 
to federal agencies, but [the] cases reveal how paltry an effort we 
have made to understand it or to confine ourselves to its 
boundaries. . . . [W]e seem to be straying further and further from 
the Constitution without so much as pausing to ask why. We should 
stop to consider that document before blithely giving the force of 
law to any other agency "interpretations" of federal statutes.74 
B. The How of Limitation 
All of the justices of the Supreme Court have written or joined opinions 
expressing the above or other concerns about Chevron. Yet the justices 
diverge as to which concerns are substantial and the weight to be accorded 
each. As a result, recent cases drain Chevron of vitality through an 
accumulation of exceptions rather than eviscerating Chevron with a single 
blow. Consider the following four avenues of erosion of Chevron on display 
in tax and non-tax cases decided since Mayo. 
1. Ignoring Chevron 
We have seen that, before Mayo, the Supreme Court sometimes applied 
Chevron or other deference doctrines in tax cases and sometimes did not, 
without explaining its choices.75 Something similar happened in 2015 in 
Inclusive Communities, a non-tax case.76 A community group sued a state 
72. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers' Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment); see also id. at 1212 (remarking that this problem is "perhaps insoluble if Chevron is not 
to be uprooted"); see also William R. Andersen, Against Chevron-A Modest Proposal, 56 ADMIN. 
L. REv. 957, 972 (2004). 
73. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct.1863, 1878 (2013) (Roberts, CJ., joined by Kennedy & 
Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
74. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713-14 (2015) (Thomas, J., cnncurring) (citations 
omitted). 
75. See supra text accompanying notes 33 to 37. 
76. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 
(2015). 
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housing agency, challenging the agency's allocation of low income housing 
tax credits. As the case was wending its way through litigation, the federal 
Department of Housing and Urban Affairs ("HUD") promulgated a 
regulation supporting the community group's interpretation of the key 
statute, the Fair Housing Act.77 By five to four, the Supreme Court held for 
the community group.78 
Chevron had no impact on the resolution of the case. The four 
dissenters thought the HUD regulation was invalid because it was contrary 
to the statute and did not represent HUD's considered view of the matter.79 
The majority was even less interested in Chevron. It resolved the case on 
the basis of statutory interpretation, without invoking Chevron.80 
2. Fashioning Exceptions 
In 2001, the Supreme Court in Mead carved a major exception out of 
Chevron,81 and other exceptions also exist. Two of them were rehearsed in 
2015 in the high profile King case, which considered the availability of tax 
credits for insurance purchased on federally created insurance exchanges.82 
The Court refused to defer to a Treasury regulation because of two 
recognized exceptions to Chevron: (1) the agency lacked expertise in the 
particular area83 and (2) absent clear indication in the statute, courts presume 
that Congress did not intend to delegate to agencies matters of deep 
economic or social significance fundamental to the statutory regime.84 
Depending on how their contours are defined in future cases, both 
exceptions have the potential to significantly limit the ambit of Chevron. 
And the common law task of forging new exceptions to deference 
doctrine continues. For example, one recent circuit court case questioned 
whether Chevron could apply to an excise tax regulation absence evidence 
77. Implementation of the Fair Hous. Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 
(Feb.15,2013). 
78. Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2525-26. 
79. Id. at 2542-43 (Alito, J ., dissenting). 
80. Id. at 2525 (''The Court holds that [the requirements of the HUD regulation] are cognizable 
under the Fair Housing Act upon considering its results·oriented language, the Court's interpretation 
of similar language in Title VII and the ADEA, Congress' ratification . . . , and the statutory 
purpose."). 
81. See supra text accompanying notes 24 to 29. 
82. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
83. Id. at 2489 (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243,266--67 (2006)). 
84. Id. (citing Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) and FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)); see Abigail R. Moncrieff, 
Reincarnating the "Major Questio1111" Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of 
Noninterference (or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 593 (2008). 
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that Treasury had taken into consideration the interpretational principle 
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law .85 Given the plethora of 
canons of construction littering the landscape, this sort of approach could 
have major implications if it becomes popular. 
Similarly, another post-Mayo tax case limited Brand X deference. In the 
Home Concrete case in 2012, the Supreme Court invalidated a Treasury 
regulation involving the extended statute of limitations on assessment 
provided by I.R.C. § 650l(e).86 Although Brand X had held that Chevron-
qualified regulations can trump judicial precedents, the plurality in Home 
Concrete held that a decision preceding the regulation had so narrowed the 
interpretational space that there was no statutory gap for Treasury to fill via 
regulation." 
3. Conflating Chevron and Other Standards 
Chevron can continue to be cited but be deprived of generative power if 
it is collapsed into or merged with other doctrines. This appears to be 
occurring. First, I and others have argued that step one logically is 
subsumed in step two, reducing Chevron to a simple reasonableness test." 
Some case law support for this approach is emerging." Similarly, an 
increasing number of cases are conflating Chevron's step two with arbitrary-
and-capricious analysis under the APA.90 
4. Applying the Standard Non-Deferentially 
Doctrines of law always have two aspects: their verbal formulation and 
the spirit in which they are applied. Of the two, the latter is far more 
important to the outcomes of controversies. The spirit in which Chevron is 
applied has changed. Chevron originally was indulgent and friendly towards 
85. Validus Reinsurance, Ltd. v. United States, 786 F.3d 1039, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (dictum). 
86. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply,LLC, 132 S. Ct.1836 (2012). 
87. Id. at 1842-44. For discussion of Home Concrete, see Steve R. Johnson, Reflections on 
Home Concrete: Writing Tax Regulations and Interpreting Tax Statutes, 13 FLA. ST. U. Bus. REV. 
77 (2014). 
88. E.g., Johnson, supra note 9, at 284-85; Matthew Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron 
Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009). 
89. E.g .• Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706-11 (2015) (invalidating a regulation aa being 
an unreasonable interpretation of the statute without locating its analysis under either step one or 
step two); Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2442-49 (ruling similar to Michigan); Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. 
at 1846 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("'Step 1' has never been an essential part of Chevron analysis.''). 
90. E.g., Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706--07; Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 
826 (2013); Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011). For discussion of judicial review 
under the arbitrary-and--capricious standard, see Mark Seidenfeld, The l"elevance of Politics for 
Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90 WASH. U. L. REY. 141 (2012). 
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agency action, and it is still spoken of that way by some.91 But that 
characterization often is no longer accurate. Now, many cases are applying 
Chevron in a searching, rigorous fashion, converting it from a shield to 
protect agency actions into a sword with which to assail them.92 
This is evident in City of Arlington, a 2013 Chevron case in which the 
Court instructed: "No matter how it is framed, the question a court faces 
when confronted with an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers is 
always, simply, whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its 
statutory authority."" The Court urged judges to "tak[e] seriously, and 
apply[] rigorously, in all cases, statutory limits on agencies' authority."94 
This rigor was in display in the 2014 Utility Air case in which the Court, 
citing City of Arlington, invalidated a non-tax regulation." In tax, it also 
was evident in the widely discussed Loving" and Ridgely97 cases 
invalidating Treasury regulations governing practice before the IRS ,98 and in 
the Supreme Court's 2015 state tax Brohl case.99 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen the rise of Chevron in tax, culminating in Mayo in 2011, 
and its fall in tax and elsewhere; a fall in substantive significance, although 
perhaps not frequency of citation. We have located the causes of the fall in 
Chevron's own inconsistencies and inadequate conceptualization. And, we 
have sketched the forms the downgrading of Chevron's significance have 
taken in recent cases .100 
Has this all been wasted judicial effort going around in a doctrinal 
circle? Does it leave us in the same place we were before Chevron was 
91. E.g.,Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707. 
92. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, Loving and Legitimacy: IRS Regulation of Tax Re'tum 
Preparation, 59 VnL. L.REV. 515, 528--29 (2014); Executive Board, supra note 59, at 239 ("Many 
modern scholars conclude that contrary to the view that Chevron mandated deference . . . , it has in 
fact given the judiciary additional power to determine the legitimacy of agency rolemaking."). 
93. City of Arlingtoo v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013). 
94. Id. at 1874. 
95. Util.AirRegulatoryGrp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442-49 (2014). 
96. Lovingv. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d67 (DD.C. 2013),aff'd, 742F.3d 1013 (D.C. CU. 2014). 
97. Ridgely v. Lew, 55 F. Supp. 3d 89 (D.D.C. 2014). 
98. For discussion of these cases, see Steve R. Johnson, How Far Does Circular 230 Exceed 
Treasury's Statutory Amhority?, 146 TAX NOTES 221 (Jan. 12, 2015). 
99. Direct Mktg. ABs'n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015); see Steve R. Jobnson, How Would the 
Supreme Court Decide Loving and Ridgely?, 147 TAX NOTES 559,561-63 (May 4,2015). 
100. Not all agree with my description of the trajectory. Some maintain that Chevron is merely 
evolving, not diminishing. E.g., Executive Board, supra note 59, at 240. This is hardly surprising. 
The history of Chevron has been marked by disagreement and "consistent shifts in ... scholarship." 
Id. at235. 
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handed down, with no recompense for the journey? No. We are better off in 
two ways. First, despite a few whose conversion remains in the future, the 
center of gravity of the tax community now understands that returning to the 
cloister of tax parochialism is not an option. 
Second, both in tax and other areas, jurists and commentators find it 
increasingly difficult to ignore or paper over the serious flaws of Chevron. 
Adopting a wider angle of vision, we see that the flaws are not those of 
Chevron alone. They infect deference doctrine generally101 and are the rot at 
the core of the separation of powers doctrine on which general 
administrative law is based. Seeing that more clearly, ours will be the 
opportunity and the obligation to mend these rents in the fabric of American 
law. 
101. Thus, concurrent with the assault on Chevron is growing uneasiness about the doctrine 
granting great deference to agencies' interpretation of their own ambiguous regulatioll8. E.g., 
Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338-39 (Roberts, CJ., concurring) & id. at 1339-
44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). This uneasiness will eventually lead, I 
believe, to abrogation of Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & 
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). See Steve R. Johnson, Auer/Seminole Rock Deference in the Tax 
Court, 11 PITT. TAX REV. 1 (2013); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock's 
Domain, 79 GEO. WASH.L.REv.1449 (2011). 
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